

PERCEPTIONS OF EASTERN FRONTIER POLICY IN AMMIANUS, LIBANIUS, AND JULIAN (337–363)*

It is the purpose of this paper to examine how Ammianus, Libanius, and Julian conceived of Roman policy on the eastern frontier from the death of Constantine to the failure of Julian's invasion of Persia. Any consideration of the actual facts is strictly secondary. The predominant conclusion will be that all three saw Rome's attitude as essentially defensive, her objective as the containment of persistent Persian aggression. This will be seen to hold good even for Julian's invasion. Explanations, when they are offered by the sources, are presented in terms of character, whether national or that of individuals: Constantius, Julian, Jovian, and Sapor. It will become apparent, and is sometimes implied, that these attitudes derive from the peace imposed by Rome in 299, with which Rome could well rest content, while Persia clearly could not.¹

Ammianus traces back Rome's defensive posture in the East to the reign of Diocletian, who, he says, established an elaborate system of fortified defences to keep the Persians from overrunning the Syrian provinces (23.5.2f.). He does not, however, connect this policy with the peace of 299, that is, with Rome's desire to consolidate the gains then made and Persia's eagerness to recover her losses.

I. THE REIGN OF CONSTANTIUS

In the necrology of Julian, in answer to Julian's detractors, who accused him of stirring up new tumults of war to the detriment of the common weal, Ammianus blames Constantine for kindling the fires of war with Persia (25.4.23f.).² The reign of Constantius is seen as a period of unbroken Persian aggression and ineffective or absent Roman response. What exactly the Persians were claiming and on what, if any, perceived legal right they based their claim Ammianus does not, however, make clear.³

Before the resumption of serious hostilities in 359 Ammianus' few references to activity on the eastern frontier paint a picture of Persian raids into Mesopotamia and Armenia which the Romans take more or less effective measures to guard against (14.3.1ff., 15.3.4).⁴ When eastern frontier policy first takes centre stage (16.9) two factors are at once apparent: disapproval of the efforts of Constantius and acknowledgement that Roman policy was defensive. The former point is economically

* I am grateful to Roger Blockley for commenting on a draft of this paper. He should not be assumed to agree with the views expressed and is not of course responsible for such faults and errors as may remain.

¹ Cf. P. A. Barceló, *Roms auswärtige Beziehungen unter der constantinischen Dynastie* (Regensburg, 1981), pp. 74ff.; R. C. Blockley, *East Roman Foreign Policy* (Leeds, 1992), pp. 5ff. For the date of the treaty, cf. T. D. Barnes, *Phoenix* 30 (1976), 182ff. For the terms, cf. Blockley, *Florilegium* 6 (1984), 30ff.

² On Constantine's possible intentions, cf. Barceló (n. 1), p. 81; B. H. Warmington in J. Fitz, *Limes* (Budapest, 1977), p. 512; Blockley in C. Deroux, *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History V* (Brussels, 1989), p. 469; *ERFP*, p. 12.

³ Cf. G. Wirth in R. Klein, *Julian Apostata* (Darmstadt, 1978), pp. 459f.; Barceló (n.1), pp. 82ff.; Blockley, *Phoenix* 42 (1988), 247f.; in Deroux (n. 2), pp. 467ff.; *ERFP*, p. 19.

⁴ On events before the initiative of Musonianus, cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), pp. 470ff.; *ERFP*, p. 13.

made by the opening word of 9.1, *at*, which contrasts the large degree of freedom allowed to the Persians with the disreputable goings-on at the court of Constantius narrated in the previous chapter. The implication is obvious: Constantius would have been better occupied devoting his attention to the situation in the East. As for the latter, the plan of Musonianus and Cassianus, of which Ammianus seems to approve, was clearly designed to secure Persian acceptance of the status quo. The absence of any threat from Rome to the West, which would leave Sapor free to concentrate on his northeastern borders, was precisely what the Roman planners hoped would make the scheme acceptable to the king despite its implied reaffirmation of the humiliation suffered by Persia in the peace of 299 (16.9.3).

It is clear that the initiative consistently rested with Persia, even though her efforts were not uniformly successful (16.9.1)—or to put it another way, the Persians were always the aggressors. The implications of *tandem aliquando* (16.9.3), whether the words express Ammianus' own view or that held by Musonianus and Cassianus, go further and are less flattering to Persia, suggesting that Sapor was wasting his time by skirmishing with Rome in the West and could have no real hope of reversing the losses of 299, if that was in fact his objective. The tactful Tamsapor rephrased this suggestion in a manner less provocative to Sapor (16.9.4): Constantius begged peace because he was hard pressed elsewhere. The net result, if negotiations were successful, would be a disengagement on the Roman-Persian frontier, leaving both sides free to concentrate their energies elsewhere. But Tamsapor's version also makes it clear that it was Persian initiative and aggression that had put Constantius under the pressure from which he was allegedly pleading to be relieved, whereas the Roman original had certainly not suggested that Rome was threatening Persia.

By the time Sapor finally received Tamsapor's message, some time in 358,⁵ his situation had changed markedly for the better. His most lively opponents, the Chionitae and Gelani, were now his allies, and he was free to concentrate on his western frontier if he wished (17.5.1). There was thus no hope that he could be persuaded to formal acceptance of the status quo of 299; if he believed that Constantius was indeed in difficulties, he was bound to make some effort to recoup Persia's earlier losses.

This he duly did. His letter, as reported by Ammianus, accuses Constantius of *pertinax alieni cupiditas* (17.5.3), but this is surely an implied reference back to 299 rather than a charge of territorial aggression aimed specifically against Constantius. Graciously abandoning his claim to all the lands up to the Strymon, Sapor demanded Armenia and Mesopotamia, of which Nerses had been deprived *composita fraude* (17.5.6).⁶ Should Rome refuse, the king threatened war in spring 359 (17.5.8). The use of *securus* in 17.5.7 to echo its occurrence in 16.9.3 underlines the contrast between the aggressive confidence of Sapor and the essentially negative attitude of the Romans. The Romans hoped that Sapor would accept the status quo and go away; Sapor demanded concessions as the price of Roman freedom from fear. But again Ammianus does not bring out the underlying reason for this difference of attitude—that, regardless of the temperaments of Constantius and Sapor, Rome had reason to be satisfied with the status quo while Persia conspicuously did not.

Constantius in reply accused Sapor in his turn of *cupiditas* (17.5.10), which carries the implication that the status quo was valid and that Sapor had no cogent grounds to

⁵ On the chronology, cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 480.

⁶ On the basic reliability of this correspondence, cf. Blockley, *ERFP*, p. 19. On the meaning of *composita fraude*, cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 480 n. 84; *ERFP*, p. 179 n. 48.

demand a revision. Any revision acceptable to Sapor would, it is clear, constitute an infringement of Rome's honour and majesty such as Constantius explicitly repudiates (17.5.12). His insistence on the strength of his own position (17.5.13) revives the implication of 16.9.3 that Sapor would be wasting his time, now even more than before, in trying to tamper with existing arrangements in the East. In conclusion Constantius states overtly that his posture is defensive, the limit of his purpose being to retaliate effectively when provoked by Persian aggression (17.5.14), but he too is made to explain this in terms of character, to wit his own *modestia*. It is perhaps worth noting that Constantius is here defending himself against charges that Sapor had not made, charges that were in fact far more likely to stem from Roman critics, though the emperor may have thought that Sapor shared this view of him.

Ammianus again alludes to Sapor's *effrenata cupiditas* when he records the dismissal of the Persian embassy (17.5.15), but the sending of the second Roman embassy marks an abrupt return to reality: its acknowledged purpose was to delay the threatened Persian invasion so as to give the Romans time to put their defences in order.⁷ Ammianus offers no comment on the wisdom of these negotiations. It could be argued that, however well intentioned Musonianus had been, delays and changing circumstances had made his initiative disastrous. Instead of securing the frontier from minor Persian incursions, it had called the region to Sapor's attention and brought about a major escalation of military activity in the region. But even if there had been no diplomatic exchanges, Sapor would probably have set about trying to recover the territories lost in 299 as soon as he was free from distractions on other frontiers.⁸

The next mention of the embassy is as close as Ammianus comes to a reference to the peace of 299 from the Roman side (17.14.1): they demanded peace *rebus integris*, i.e. with no change in the territorial status quo. This is then spelt out: *ne super turbando Armeniae vel Mesopotamiae statu quicquam moveretur*.⁹ The allusion to the *utilitas* and *maiestas* of Rome in this connection picks up the use of *maiestas* in Constantius' letter (17.5.12) and confirms that Constantius was there implying that concessions would be incompatible with Roman dignity. But Sapor was equally determined: no peace without territorial concessions (17.14.2). The implication that he would have made peace if Rome had given way on this question is reasonable enough: why should he fight if he could get what he wanted?

The preparations for the invasion of 359 are again placed under the rubric of Sapor's *cupiditas* for territorial aggrandisement (18.4.1); Ammianus betrays no awareness that Sapor was in his own eyes merely trying to recover what was rightfully his. Similarly Rome is presented as merely defending herself against unwarranted Persian aggression: the mission of Ursicinus was to protect the East (18.4.2).

The deserter Antoninus, brought into the presence of Sapor, was wont to rehearse the history of the past forty years (18.5.7), that is, the period during which Sapor had been making some effort to undo the treaty of 299, though Ammianus does not explain the significance of the choice of date. Throughout this time, Antoninus said, the Persians, despite their successes, had never reached Edessa or the Euphrates

⁷ Cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 481, with n. 87 on the text of 17.5.15.

⁸ For the possibility that Musonianus' initiative actually encouraged Sapor to think of intervention in Mesopotamia, cf. Warmington (n. 2), p. 515; A. D. Lee in P. Freeman and D. Kennedy, *The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East* ii (Oxford, 1986), p. 459 (conceding that Sapor might have attacked anyway); contra: Barceló (n. 1), pp. 90f.

⁹ The use of *turbare* here, with its connotations of interference with what is right and proper, is extremely appropriate to the Roman point of view. Cf. R. Seager, *Ammianus Marcellinus, Seven Studies in his Language and Thought* (Columbia, 1986), pp. 92ff.

bridges, even though, with Rome's armies engaged in bloody civil wars, they should have been able to overrun the whole of Asia (18.5.7). The implication is again that Sapor was moved by unfocused and all-embracing territorial aggression, ranging far beyond the limited objective of recovering the losses of 299. So too the statement (18.5.8) that by his speeches Antoninus exacerbated a Sapor who was already eager for war again implies that the king's objectives were unlimited.¹⁰ The reaction of the provincials to the news of Ursicinus' promotion to the presence again underlines Rome's purely defensive posture: they revered him as their defender, who, charged with protecting them, had in ten years suffered no losses, despite the inadequacy of the forces at his disposal (18.6.2).

Antoninus advised Sapor to avoid the delays of besieging fortress cities and instead to resort to a *Blitzkrieg*, crossing the Euphrates and occupying Rome's eastern provinces before she had time to mount effective resistance (18.6.3).¹¹ Sapor allegedly approved (18.6.4), which might even be true: sieges had brought him little joy in the past and if the plan was successful he would be in a very strong position to demand his true and limited objective as the price of his withdrawal.

The news was sufficient to make Constantius return Ursicinus to the East (18.6.5). Ammianus talks of a plot to discredit him, but in the midst of all this it is clear that Rome's aim was merely to repel the imminent Persian invasion: if the Persians returned to their own country without accomplishing anything, that would count as a conspicuous Roman success (18.6.6). Given past experience, it was hardly surprising that the defence of Nisibis against a Persian surprise attack was Ursicinus' first priority (18.6.8). The first indication that Sapor might have changed his plans came after Ursicinus and Ammianus had reached Amida, with the receipt of the coded message from Procopius (18.6.17).¹² It too takes at face value the notion that Sapor's objective was to secure lasting control of the entire Roman East (18.6.19). This provoked drastic Roman countermeasures: the abandonment of Carrhae, the adoption of a scorched-earth policy covering all the land between Tigris and Euphrates (18.7.3f.), and the fortification of the Roman bank of the Euphrates to keep the Persians from crossing (18.7.6).

Ammianus' narrative implies that the scorched-earth policy was in some degree successful, hinting that it saved Nisibis (18.7.8) and suggesting that the Persian decision to turn north was forced upon them by two considerations: the Euphrates was unfordable further south and there would be plentiful supplies further north where the scorched-earth policy had not been put into practice (18.7.9f.).¹³ The Roman response to this change pursued the same objective as before: to prevent Persian penetration West of the Euphrates, now by destroying the bridges at Zeugma and Capersana (18.8.1).¹⁴

¹⁰ Warmington (n.2), p. 515, believes that the objective of the *Blitzkrieg* was merely to force Constantius to battle. Blockley, *Phoenix* 42 (1988), 244, assumes that, even if Sapor had intended to invade Syria (which he denies; cf. next note), the object would have been merely plunder, not conquest.

¹¹ Blockley, *Phoenix* 42 (1988), 251ff., argues (rejecting the story of the Euphrates flood) that Sapor never intended to invade Syria but was aiming at Amida from the first (thus also briefly *ERFP*, p. 22), though in Deroux (n. 2), pp. 483ff., he appears to accept Sapor's change of plan as genuine.

¹² For the message, cf. Blockley, *Phoenix* 42 (1988), 256; in Deroux (n. 2), p. 484. As remarked by J. F. Matthews in Freeman and Kennedy (n. 8), p. 558, the message gave no details of the planned invasion route.

¹³ Blockley, *Phoenix* 42 (1988), 256ff., seems to neglect this factor.

¹⁴ On the geography, cf. Blockley, *Phoenix* 42 (1988), 253ff.

The historian's comments on the significance of Amida are also of interest. The enlarged and fortified Amida was to be a secure refuge for the people of the region when threatened by Persian aggression (18.9.1). The implication is that already in the time of Constantine he or Constantius thought it likely that the Persians would invade in this area even though it was not in a region claimed by Persia in rectification of the treaty of 299; that is, the Romans never believed that Sapor's territorial ambitions were limited.

Despite his alleged new strategy, Sapor seems still to have hankered after Roman fortresses—not only Nisibis (18.10.3), but also Amida, which he invited to surrender, though at first he had no intention of mounting a siege if it refused (19.1.3, cf. 18.10.1). The decision to destroy the city is explained, however, as usual, in terms of personal considerations: Sapor's irritation at being shot at and the obligation to avenge the death of Grumbates' son. It is presented as at least a partial abandonment of the planned *Blitzkrieg*, undertaken against the advice of his senior officers (19.1.6, 2.1, 3).¹⁵

Ammianus' account of Roman reactions to the siege of Amida is bedevilled by his obsession with the supposed plot against his hero Ursicinus. Ursicinus wanted Amida relieved; Sabinianus refused, claiming orders from Constantius which made avoidance of Roman losses the top priority (19.3.1f.). It is at least likely that he interpreted Constantius' wishes in this unexpected situation correctly: if the Persians, instead of overrunning the whole of Mesopotamia and perhaps beyond, were tied down all summer at Amida, that would be a satisfactory enough result, and the fall of Amida could hardly have been predicted. In fact, of course, even though Amida fell, its resistance ensured that Sapor had neither time nor manpower to accomplish anything else that season (19.9.1f., 9).

The chronological distortions¹⁶ in Ammianus' account of Constantius' reaction to the fall of Amida need not invalidate his comment (19.11.17) that Roman priorities remained the same: to check Persian incursions. The fall of Amida merely made the matter more urgent; the Romans had not lost their conviction that Sapor planned to cross the Euphrates.

Ursicinus uttered a final warning before his dismissal: even an expedition in full force by Constantius might not be able to prevent the dismemberment of Mesopotamia when the Persians invaded again in spring 360 (20.2.4).¹⁷ Ursicinus would certainly not have watered down the Persian threat as he perceived it; therefore, if he is accurately reported, he at least did not credit the more wide-ranging territorial ambitions Ammianus ascribes to Sapor. On his first mention of Constantius' request for reinforcements from Julian, Ammianus has no doubt that the Persian invasion threatened for 360 is genuine (20.4.1), nor does he earlier express any disagreement with Ursicinus' estimate of the danger. But he then treats the reason offered for the need for haste, that Constantius planned to move against the Persians in early spring, as no more than a pretext (20.4.2).¹⁸

When Ammianus turns to the Persian invasion of 360, it comes as a surprise to read that Sapor was eager to gain control of Mesopotamia while Constantius was still

¹⁵ Cf. P. De Jonge on 19.1.6. The suggestion that Sapor was forced to besiege Amida to appease his allies (Matthews (n. 12), p. 557; *The Roman Empire of Ammianus* [London, 1989], p. 58) may underestimate the king's own fit of pique.

¹⁶ On which, cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 485 at n. 103.

¹⁷ J. Szidat, ad loc., observes that Constantius clearly knew better.

¹⁸ On the justification of the request, cf. Warmington (n. 2), p. 516.

occupied elsewhere and that his first action was the traditional one of an attack on a Roman fortified city, Singara (20.6.1). Of *Blitzkrieg* and the overwhelming of the entire Roman East there is no word. Ammianus' explanation of the lack of any attempt to relieve Singara (20.6.8f.)—which moves him to none of the outrage he expressed at the failure to save Amida—underlines Rome's defensive attitude: most of the army was guarding Nisibis. What Sapor did with Singara after he had transplanted the inhabitants is not stated.¹⁹ His next target was Bezabde (20.7.1), rather than Nisibis; this is again strikingly consistent with an overall objective of the rectification of the peace of 299, since Ammianus admits that the region in which it stood, Zabdicene, was disputed between Rome and Persia (20.7.1). After its capture Sapor repaired and garrisoned it (20.7.16, cf. 11.6). He is said to have feared, as actually happened, a Roman attempt to recover it; whether he did not think the Romans would try to recover Singara, or judged it too difficult to hold or not worth holding because of the defects of its position (20.6.9), is not made clear.

Only now, after narrating Sapor's campaign of 360, does Ammianus revert to Constantius' plans of the previous winter (20.8.1), which seem to concentrate yet again on limiting by careful preparation the damage that the inevitable Persian invasion would cause.²⁰ After he heard of Julian's usurpation he had to decide whether to deal with the Persian threat first, and Ammianus admits that his decision was the right one, though he refuses to give Constantius the credit for it (20.9.3). He stresses Constantius' slowness in moving, after he had prudently confirmed the loyalty of Arsaces (20.11.1ff.): a long delay at Edessa (20.4.4), followed by departure for Amida after the autumnal equinox. His offer to the defenders of Bezabde (20.11.7) implies yet again Rome's standing on the validity of the settlement of 299: the defenders might return to their own people if they gave up without bloodshed the property of others, or accepted Roman rule. Constantius' meditations as to whether to carry on the siege (20.11.24) despite the lateness of the season again reveal a defensive frame of mind: the value of Bezabde is said to be as a barrier against Persian inroads. But eventually the worsening weather forced him to give up and withdraw (20.11.25, 31f.).

Constantius allegedly feared a more serious Persian invasion in 361 (21.6.7f.). Ammianus says nothing directly about its expected scope, but he notes that the Romans sent envoys to the kings and satraps beyond the Tigris, above all Arsaces and Meribanes, to try to secure their loyalty. Whether this should be seen as an acknowledgement that Sapor's objective was no more than a rectification of the treaty of 299 is doubtful: the loyalty of Armenia and Iberia was of vital importance to Rome whatever Sapor was trying to achieve. Yet again Constantius was faced with the choice between dealing with Persia or Julian first. His decision was to finish, or as Ammianus puts it, mollify the Persian war first, so as to leave himself free to nip Julian's rebellion in the bud without any threat to his back (21.7.1). It is hard to translate Ammianus' statement into concrete practical terms. His language seems to hint at a negotiated settlement. But it is hard to imagine what kind of settlement might have satisfied Sapor. Constantius' subsequent movements offer no real clue to what he had (or Ammianus thought he had) in mind. He stationed himself at Edessa, waiting to see the line of the Persian advance (21.7.7): it does, however, appear that he may have been planning to offer a set-piece battle, success in which might make it possible to arrange some kind of truce.²¹ This is slightly clarified a little later (21.13.1), when Constantius is presented as hesitating between two courses: set battle or a renewed attempt to

¹⁹ Cf. Blockley, *Florilegium* 6 (1984), 35f. with n. 44.

²⁰ Cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), pp. 484ff.

²¹ Cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 486.

recover Bezbade. For the moment he was ready to wait until it became clear what Sapor intended to do (21.13.2ff.), though Ammianus makes it seem as if there was some confusion between Constantius and Arbitio and Agilo, the generals he sent forward to observe the Tigris crossings, as to what their remit was.²²

Once Constantius was free to turn against Julian, a passing remark in his speech to the troops at Hierapolis is striking: he had appointed Gallus as Caesar, he says, to protect the East (21.13.11).²³ It is such casual references that are perhaps most revealing of the assumption of an essentially defensive policy.

In his panegyric of Constantius (*Or.* 59) Libanius too traces the history of the Persian problem back only to the reign of Constantine. Aggression is all on the Persian side, and though the war began before Constantine's death, the burden of it was inherited by Constantius (59.60). Libanius then considers the Persian motive for aggression, aggression that might seem surprising when in the past they had been happy if Rome did not attack them (62). His explanation is that they had been meditating war for a long time before they actually initiated hostilities (62) and had kept the peace for so long only in order to build up their strength for war (63), thinking that their earlier failures had come about because they had been insufficiently prepared. After lengthy description of Sapor's preparations (64-70) Libanius comes to Sapor's first move when all was ready. The king sent an embassy to dispute about boundaries (71). If Rome yielded to his demands, he would achieve his aims without needing to fight; if she did not, this would serve as his pretext for war.

It is thus clear, though Libanius does not make it so, that again everything is to be traced back to the peace of 299, with which the Romans could rest content, so that they had no motive for aggression, but which Sapor was determined to overturn as soon as he felt strong enough to do so. The disputed boundaries will have been those laid down in the treaty.

Rome's satisfaction with the status quo of 299 is borne out by Libanius' description of Constantius' remit when Constantine decided to allow him the glory of putting Sapor in his place (72): Constantius was left as the guardian of the cities of the East (73). So too the death of Constantine is seen as presenting Constantius with an essentially defensive problem: the distraction of his father's funeral might have opened up the empire to the enemy, which implies that the most Constantius wanted or needed to do was to keep the Persians out.

To disentangle any hint of policy from the clouds of Libanius' panegyric is difficult. The Persian invasion was delayed, allegedly through fear (74), and when Constantius invaded Persia he found no-one to oppose him, again, as Libanius would have it, because the Persians were afraid to face him in battle (76). Constantius wintered at Antioch and again invaded Persia in the spring (77). Once more his problem was to find some Persians to fight (78), while the cities of Syria no longer feared attack and destruction as they had in the past (79). Somewhat defensively Libanius admits that there were still minor Persian inroads (80), in which they took advantage of the Romans being offguard because of the truce. The picture (81) is of trivial Persian incursions in search of booty when Constantius was absent and sedulous avoidance of battle when the emperor was present. Libanius insists, perhaps too much, that Constantius' successes filled those who lived close to Persia with joy for the present and optimism for the future (86).

An apparent departure from the prevailing defensive conception of Roman policy

²² Contrast the order at 21.13.3 with the generals' request for reinforcements at 21.13.5.

²³ Cf. Blockley, *Latomus* 31 (1972), 441ff.

occurs when Libanius, speaking of Scythian aid for Rome, describes the objective as the maintenance of the stability of the Roman empire and the overthrow of Persian power (92). However, it is not clear whether this means more than rendering Persia too weak to constitute a serious threat in the future.

The account of Singara (99ff.) is too eulogistic to afford an easy foothold. The battle is presented as a Roman victory, or more precisely a victory for Constantius (99). The Persians were reduced to desperation by Constantius' invasions and the length of the war (100). The basic fact that the Persians invaded Roman territory is explained as an elaborate ruse by Constantius to draw Sapor into a trap: the Persians were to be allowed to cross the Tigris and advance undisturbed (102). This develops the notion expressed earlier, that the Persians were afraid to face Constantius in battle whenever he invaded. This time he was determined that they should not have the opportunity to escape, and so wanted to lure them well into Roman territory.

After an account of the battle (104–112) which stresses that Constantius saw through the Persian trap and does not blame him for his inability to control his men sufficiently to stop them from falling into it, Libanius sums up the Roman achievement (112): they drove the enemy from the land. This appears to revert to a purely defensive stance: it is enough for Rome successfully to repel a Persian invasion. It also raises an obvious question: what was the point of allowing the Persians to invade merely to have to go to the trouble of driving them out again? This question is not as frivolous as it may appear, and perhaps admits of an answer. Constantius might have thought that a resounding defeat inflicted on an invading force would demonstrate more effectively to the Persians that invasion was likely to prove counter-productive than merely to prevent such an invasion from taking place at all. But Libanius' somewhat defensive presentation (113) suggests that not all were inclined to adopt so favourable an interpretation. Who, he asks rhetorically, would deny that the Persians were defeated, since they came to secure control of the land of others but had to abandon their hopes and depart? One suspects that many might have raised their hands. The limited objective defined in 112 recurs when Libanius pursues the point in 114: the Roman troops were clearly victorious, some—the dead—in spirit, the living because they did not return until they had cleansed the land of enemies.

In 115ff. Libanius sets out to produce further proofs of Roman victory. He recapitulates (116) his earlier point that the Persians had been deliberately allowed to invade unopposed. During the battle the Persians lost their camp, their financial reserves, and Sapor's son (117), and the behaviour of the Persians in general and especially Sapor after the battle provides confirmation (118). Information on all these matters came from Persian deserters and so deserved credence (119); hence the fact of the victory is beyond dispute. It is intriguing that Libanius adds a rider (120) to this resounding conclusion, which goes a long way towards undermining it. Both sides agree, he says, that the Persians who survived the night battle withdrew. There are therefore only two possibilities—an assertion bound to raise the gravest suspicions in any reader familiar with certain works of Cicero. Either they were defeated and fled, or they were victorious but still felt the need for caution in the future. If the former was the case, then obviously the Romans won; if the latter, the result remains a victory for Constantius' strategic sense. Thus the antithesis established earlier between Constantius and his troops fulfils its principal purpose.

If Libanius' utterances in *Or.* 59 are coloured by the need to praise Constantius, his later comments are equally distorted in the opposite direction, when he contrasts Constantius' alleged incompetence and inertia with the supposedly magnificent

achievements of Julian. Most of his remarks are to be found in the *Epitaphios*, so justice for Constantius can hardly be expected. However, the very first mention of the subject establishes the familiar defensive interpretation of Roman policy on the eastern frontier. In 351 Constantius had two wars on his hands, against the Persians and Magnentius, and so he needed a partner in power; hence the appointment of Gallus as Caesar to protect the eastern provinces (*Or.* 18.16). Yet when Constantius found himself confronted with exactly the same situation a few years later Libanius maintains that the East did not need defending (18.90ff.). Constantius' demand for troops from Julian was inspired solely by jealousy of his Caesar's successes; the Persian war was a mere pretext, since a fraction of the troops that Constantius already had in the East would have sufficed, even if he had had any real intention of facing the Persians in battle, which Libanius denies. Yet later he claims that Constantius had stripped the eastern provinces of all protection in preparing for his war against Julian (18.165), a point more fully treated earlier in the consular oration (12.71f.). Only a handful of inferior troops had been left to defend the cities, and 'we', says Libanius, had expected them to be plundered, which had led to panic.²⁴

His summary of operations under Constantius (18.205ff., cf. 19.49) is equally damning. Constantius' elaborate preparations had never meant a thing. He had inherited from Constantine a war that required daring and strategic expertise, but he was to prove equally ineffective in attack and defence: he took nothing from the Persians and could not even prevent them from seizing Roman possessions. Libanius presents a picture of annual Persian invasions met with a belated and spineless Roman response which enabled the Persians to slight fortifications, destroy cities, and amass booty, while Constantius did no more than inspect the damage and give thanks that he had avoided battle. In the course of this account Libanius alludes to Singara, presenting it more realistically as a draw. However, he is later constrained to admit, in order to discredit Jovian, that at least Sapor never forced Constantius to seek peace (18.257).

In his first panegyric on Constantius Julian makes a remark which, though its subject is Constans not Constantius, is revealing of his (or perhaps Constantius') views on frontier policy. He says (*Or.* 1.9D) that Constans kept the land untrodden by the enemy and went on frequent expeditions against them. The syntax, subordinating *epistrateuon* to *eteresan abaton*, suggests that defence was predominant and that the expeditions were confined to preventive or punitive strikes.

He gives his approval (18A–D) to those who compelled the Persians to observe satisfactory peace terms. Thus he comes closer than either Ammianus or Libanius to tracing the history of the question in the fourth century back to the peace treaty of 299 and Persian dissatisfaction with it, since he stresses that the Persians accepted its terms only through fear. It is predictable that the Persians would break the peace when they felt strong enough to do so, and, like Ammianus and Libanius, Julian is clear that this took place while Constantine was still alive, though his death prevented his punishing them in person. When Constantius was sent to the East war was already smouldering, soon to burst into flames (13B). The familiar pattern of Persian aggression designed to change a situation satisfactory to Rome, which acts only to defend the status quo and punish that aggression, is thus once more established.

Julian shows a considerable awareness of the problems that confronted Constantius and is in particular alive to the vital importance of the loyalty of Armenia (18D, 20A)

²⁴ On the Syrian bias of criticism of Constantius, cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 487.

and the Arab tribes (21B).²⁵ When Constantius is at last free and ready to take action he is presented as carrying out repeated invasions of Persia (22A–C), which brought booty to Rome and freedom to the cities, while the Persians were either afraid to face him or easily defeated. But these expeditions were merely acts of revenge for Persian aggression; it was the Persians who had violated the treaties and broken the peace (20C, cf. 18B).

In his treatment of Singara Julian admits that the battle was a draw, while most men would reckon it a Persian victory (23A–B). But, like Libanius, he interprets Constantius' trouble with his troops in a manner complimentary to the emperor (23B, 25A). He also stresses that the Romans waited for the Persians to begin the battle, since they wished to appear to be acting in self-defence and not to seem responsible for breaking the peace (23C). In the light of his earlier remarks this comes as something of a surprise, since we might expect any Roman initiative to be construed as justified reprisal for earlier Persian aggression, especially since the Persians had invaded Roman territory (whether or not, as Libanius claims, Constantius had lured them into doing so). The account of the battle also highlights the theme of retribution for Persian offences: a reluctance to see the Persians escape unpunished serves as an excuse for the army's eagerness to pursue the retreating enemy against Constantius' orders (24A).

Later, Constantius' posture again appears as defensive, at least in his own inevitable absence, when he takes measures for the defence of the Syrian cities before setting off to the West to deal with Magnentius and Vetranio (26D). The Persians are again presented as waiting only for a favourable opportunity to invade (27A). Their objective is said to have been to seize Syria, which if taken at face value gives them an aim going beyond the rectification of the peace of 299. But the failure of the siege of Nisibis and the losses he sustained left Sapor glad to keep the peace for the time being, hoping only that Constantius would be too busy to deal with him (28D). The picture of Persian aggression and potential Roman reprisals is again clearly drawn. That Rome's aspirations were essentially defensive is reaffirmed in the summary judgement of Constantius' achievement in the East (29A): his supreme glory was to have repelled the might of Persia, virtually without loss. Here at least Julian seems to share Constantius' own awareness of the importance of manpower.

In the second panegyric the Homeric comparison in which Julian presents Sapor as the ally of Magnentius (*Or.* 2.62C) at least implies an understanding that Sapor chose his moment in the hope that Constantius would be distracted by Magnentius' usurpation, while the bizarre claim that the Persians are actually Parthians pretending to be Persians (63A–B) in order to make it appear that they are merely reclaiming the kingdom they once held may betray an awareness that the Persians were in their own view trying to rectify a situation which they found unacceptable. As in the earlier speech, Julian presents the result of Sapor's failure at Nisibis as a readiness on his part to keep the peace, grateful if Constantius refrains from taking vengeance (66D–67A), though this is said to be only a de-facto arrangement, unreinforced by oaths or treaties.

II. THE INVASION OF JULIAN

The expedition of Julian represents such a dramatic departure from the pattern of Roman military undertakings under Constantius that one might expect it to be

²⁵ Cf. Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 473.

justified in other ways. However, a principle enunciated by Julian himself (*Or.* 2.86B) may serve as text for a discussion which will show that the themes of defence against and revenge for Persian aggression are no less prominent now than they were under Constantius. According to Julian, the good and kingly man does not commit acts of aggression, but if he is attacked he defends himself vigorously, not desisting until he has made his enemy subject to himself. This gives colour to the view that his ultimate aim was nothing less than total conquest, albeit in a war of revenge, just as he presents Alexander's war against Persia as revenge for the ancient offences of the Persians against Greece (*Or.* 2.95B, *Caes.* 323D).²⁶

Ammianus' first statement on Julian's motivation (22.12.1) is that the emperor was most eager to avenge past acts of Persian aggression. The keynote is still that Roman action against Persia is always a reaction to Persian provocation, even though this time the response was to be of a very different kind. For sixty years such fighting as there had been had taken place almost exclusively on Roman soil (at least in Roman eyes). That was now to change. Ammianus adds two personal motives: a general eagerness for the hurly-burly of war and a desire for the title Parthicus (22.12.2). None of these motives gives any clue to Julian's practical war aims, to what, that is, would in his eyes constitute adequate revenge.

The departure from recent practice is highlighted again in Ammianus' next mention of the subject, in a context of omens unfavourable for a ruler about to invade another's territory (23.1.7, with strong antithesis between *aliena pervadere molienti rectori* and *irruentibus armis externis*).²⁷ The use of *aliena* recalls its repeated employment in criticisms of Sapor's greed for territorial expansion. The boot now seems to be on the other foot, but again there is no hint of the ultimate goal of this planned invasion of Persian territory. The language used to describe Julian's confident rejection of foreign aid again indicates that the expedition was conceived as a response, however vigorous, to Persian aggression: whether *vindicari* here (23.2.1) means 'be avenged' or 'be defended' it would probably be otiose to enquire too closely. The novelty of a Roman invasion of Persia is again implied in a comment on Julian's haste to occupy enemy territory (23.2.2f.), but yet again there is nothing to suggest the ultimate object. His angry departure from Antioch may afford a clue: he told the Antiochenes that he proposed to winter at Tarsus (23.2.5). Therefore, at least in the first instance, if Julian was telling the truth, the war was to occupy only one season. This might, but need not, imply a limited objective.²⁸

Ammianus' next comment is again in a prophetic context, the dispute over the omen of the giant lion. In the view of the professionals the sign was unfavourable to a prince

²⁶ The idea that Julian intended to conquer Persia is widely dismissed, usually on the inadequate ground that such a goal was unrealistic. Thus e.g. P. Petit in R. Braun and J. Richer, *L'empereur Julien. De l'histoire à la légende* (Paris, 1978), p. 80; Barceló (n. 1), pp. 98f.; Blockley in Deroux (n. 2), p. 468; Matthews (n. 15), p. 139. But cf. Wirth (n. 3), pp. 460ff., 483ff.; A. Marcone, *Athen.* 57 (1979), 343ff.; F. Paschoud, *REL* 58 (1980), 122. On the Alexander motif and its possible value as a disguise for the fact that Julian was to some extent reviving the policies of Constantine, cf. Marcone, 342f.; W. E. Kaegi Jr, *Athen.* 59 (1981), 209ff.; Barceló (n. 1), p. 100; and especially Blockley, *ERFP*, p. 25. That Julian's admiration for Alexander was not unqualified is rightly stressed by R. Scholl, *Historische Beiträge zu den julianischen Reden des Libanios* (Stuttgart, 1994), p. 138.

²⁷ On the doom-laden atmosphere of Ammianus' narrative, cf. D. Conduché, *Latomus* 24 (1965), 364ff.; R. L. Rike, *Apex Omnium* (Berkeley, 1987), p. 61; Matthews (n.15), pp. 132, 176ff.

²⁸ Stressed e.g. by Barceló (n. 1), pp. 98f., but cf. Wirth (n. 3), p. 483.

invading another's territory, even though he was in the right (23.5.10).²⁹ Thus the novelty of carrying the war to the Persians is overtly stressed, the motive of revenge for Persian aggression perhaps implied in *iuste*. The implication that Julian was not merely invading but seeking to gain control of Persian territory is brought out by the precedent of Nerses, who was defeated by Galerius after he had seized Armenia, which was under Roman jurisdiction (23.5.11).

In his speech to his men Julian deals with an assertion made by his critics which, if taken at face value, is most bizarre: that this was the first time a Roman army had ever invaded Persia (23.5.16). Such a complaint seems to stem from a conception of Roman policy that was defensive in the narrowest sense and did not allow Rome to do any more than repel Persian incursions. Julian cites suitable precedents to dispose of this eccentric claim. More interestingly, he is made to say something about his own motives. First he speaks of vengeance for cities and armies lost, and defeats inflicted (23.5.18), then of his desire to strengthen the state by securing its eastern flank, which will guarantee his reputation with posterity. This suggests a defensive cast of mind which might jar with what Julian goes on to say (23.5.19) of his war aims—the first time these have been mentioned at all. It is necessary, he says, to destroy the Persians, again putting forward revenge as his justification. Given the precedents he cites—Carthage, Numantia, and, somewhat bathetically, Fidenae, Falerii and Veii (23.5.20)—he must be allowed to mean what he says.³⁰ So we have here the apotheosis of 'defensive imperialism': Persia must be destroyed to guarantee the security of Rome's eastern provinces.

It is still not apparent what the destruction of Persia might entail in practical terms: Persia was not a city like Carthage or Numantia, to be physically annihilated. A clue comes from the enemy side. When Julian attempted to persuade Thilutha to surrender (24.2.1) the inhabitants refused, but said that when the Romans had occupied the interior they would go over to the victors as attributes of the kingship. This implies that they thought Julian was bent on conquering Persia and succeeding to Sapor's throne after the manner of Alexander. The same response was received from Achaiachala (24.2.2). Julian himself gives an ambiguous hint in his speech to the troops after the burning of Pirisabora (24.3.4f.). Success will win the riches of Persia, a prospect he contrasts with the policy of buying peace from barbarians, which has ruined the treasury, cities, and provinces. On a minimalist interpretation he might be speaking merely of the acquisition of plentiful booty from a single campaign. But it is perhaps more likely that this passage too suggests that his aim was permanent conquest and that he has in mind the long-term economic benefits that would accrue to Rome from such a conquest. The oaths he takes at the end of the speech—to send the Persians under the yoke and restore the shaken Roman world (24.3.9)—are at least compatible with this. In other words, the conquest of Persia will bring to the entire Roman world security and economic revival, just as Julian's defeats of the Alamanni had done to the devastated provinces of Gaul. There may be a hint of the same policy in what Ammianus says of Julian after the decision not to lay siege to Ctesiphon (24.7.3), though the text is far from certain. If it is correct, Julian is critical of his generals for advising him to give up the kingdom of Persia which he had already nearly won. It is striking that Ammianus here describes

²⁹ On the conflict between *haruspices* and 'philosophers', cf. Conduché (n. 27), 368ff.; Rike (n. 27), p. 63; Scholl (n. 26), p. 141.

³⁰ Cf. Marcone (n. 26), 334ff. The parallel between what Julian is made to say here by Ammianus and his own words at *Or.* 2.86B is striking.

him as *avidae semper ad ulteriora cupiditatis*, language again close to that usually reserved for Sapor.

In the necrology Ammianus attributes to Julian two motives, both of which have been canvassed earlier: a desire to restore the East as he had revived Gaul, and a yearning for glory (25.4.26). The connotations of restoration are not here spelt out, but comparison with Julian's own earlier remarks on the subject suggests that Ammianus is here underwriting the idea that Julian's objective was to conquer Persia in order to bring security and economic recovery to the eastern provinces.

In the period between Constantius' death and Julian's expedition Libanius' expectations and aspirations also remain defensive. Even though Constantius had stripped the East of protection, there was no Persian attack on any city (*Or.* 18.165). Again the consular oration had been more effusive (12.74): the mere fact of Julian's accession had saved the peoples of the East from captivity. Similarly in *Ep.* 737.1, the anticipated arrival of Julian means that the land is clear of enemies.

The motive most commonly canvassed for the expedition, namely revenge, is entirely compatible with a defensive posture, as in Libanius' observation on the revival of religion: that it constituted a wall around the Roman empire (12.91), a statement both preceded and followed by dreams of vengeance and conquest. Julian is said in the *Epitaphios* to have been eager to set out to take revenge on the Persians (18.163). Hence his rejection of the Persian offer of negotiations at Antioch: he could contemplate no settlement until the Persians had paid for their earlier depredations (18.163, cf. 166, 12.74ff.). The point is elaborated later in the speech (18.256). The *Monody* goes so far as to suggest that the Persian embassy at Antioch was offering unconditional surrender (17.19).³¹ The treatment again concentrates on the theme of vengeance. Not to exact justice for the sufferings endured by the lands close to the Tigris would in Julian's eyes have seemed tantamount to treason (cf. *Ep.* 1402.1). But here Libanius sadly concedes that perhaps the penalty Julian sought to exact was disproportionate to the crime (17.20).³²

But what did Libanius think Julian was trying to achieve in practical terms? At times he is vague, speaking only of causing harm or damage to Persia (15.81). So Julian prays at Carrhae that Zeus will allow him to harm the Persians (18.214), and is said to have wanted to do them the greatest damage possible (18.231). His interest in divination too was focused, according to Libanius, on only one question: whether he would do harm to the Persians (18.306). A letter links belief that Julian will succeed in this aim with the fact that he is not the aggressor but is only responding to Persian aggression (*Ep.* 1343.1).

But occasionally more precise and grandiose objectives surface, based, it would seem, on the example of Alexander. The very first words of the *Epitaphios* claim that Libanius and all men of good will had expected the overthrow of Persia and the addition of its territories to the Roman empire, with Roman officials taking the place of Persian satraps and ruling in accordance with Roman law (18.1). This vision recurs towards the end of the speech: the Persian empire would have been part of the Roman, paying tribute, under Roman magistrates and Roman laws, while Persian youths in Susa enjoyed the benefits of sophistic education (18.282).

³¹ The embassy at least is probably historical. Cf. Barceló (n. 1), p. 99; Blockley, *Florilegium* 6 (1984), 34.

³² Scholl (n. 26), pp. 134ff. argues that the consular oration reveals veiled disapproval of the planned expedition and indirectly attempts to put pressure on Julian to negotiate. This seems to me inconsistent with the second half of *Or.* 12.74.

Such a conception, with its echoes of Alexander, is consistent with the breathtakingly unrealistic ground offered for Julian's rejection of the alleged Persian peace offer just before the final battle: he did not want to bring the war to a close before he had ranged over all the territories of the Persian empire as far as Hyrcania and the rivers of India (18.258ff.). Such an expectation of total conquest also seems to underlie the Horatian closing prayer of the consular oration, for long life and a victory banquet in Susa, with Persians waiting on Roman troops (12.99f.).³³ In a letter Libanius speaks of an alternative plan: the removal of Sapor and the substitution of Hormisdas as a Roman puppet (*Ep.* 1402.3). Though somewhat less extreme than the vision of direct Roman rule purveyed in the speeches, this too presupposes the total conquest of Persia, which alone would put the throne in Julian's gift. It might be argued that such fantasies belong only to panegyric and in detail only to posthumous panegyric, that neither Libanius, Julian himself, nor anyone else could seriously have expected the permanent conquest of Persia.³⁴ That may be too rational a view.

III. JOVIAN AND THE PEACE OF 363

Ammianus' lacunose account of the events that led up to the conclusion of peace is full of contradictions.³⁵ First (25.7.1–3) Sapor is presented as deeply afraid because of the Romans' successes, his own losses, the fact that Roman morale was still high despite Julian's death, and the great resources of manpower still available to Rome. Then comes a section (25.7.4) which makes clear the real and desperate plight of the Roman army, followed by the news that the Persians, *praeter sperata*, took the initiative in opening peace negotiations (25.7.5). *Praeter sperata* is revealing: obviously the men on the ground were not under the misapprehension that they were winning. Yet Ammianus still claims that Sapor was also downhearted because the Romans were consistently victorious in battle. *Quoque*, however, is also revealing: if it means anything, it must constitute an admission that the Romans were themselves depressed. Ammianus is at least conscious of his own illogicality: *autem* (25.7.6) admits that it is paradoxical that the supposedly downhearted Persians should have offered such harsh terms, terms which in fact suggest that they were well aware of the true strength of their position.

Ammianus' account of Sapor's demands (25.7.9) reveals at least that there were disputed territories at stake: he laid claim to lands which he said were his and had been seized long ago by Galerius. But these, as the structure of Ammianus' sentence indicates, were not what Sapor actually required: the five Transtigritane regions, the fifteen fortresses, and the cities of Nisibis, Singara, and Castra Maurorum. Quite what Ammianus is intending to convey by the antithesis between *ut ipse aiebat* and *ut docebat autem negotium* is unclear. In fact Sapor was asking for rather less than had

³³ Cf. Hor. *C.* 1.2.45ff.

³⁴ Cf. above, n. 26.

³⁵ For various estimates of the situation, cf. R. Turcan, *Mélanges Piganiol II* (Paris, 1966), pp. 876ff. (exaggeratedly positive); N. J. E. Austin, *Athen.* 50 (1972), 301ff.; R. T. Ridley, *Historia* 22 (1973), 326 (also extremely positive); Wirth (n. 3), pp. 461ff. (violently negative); Paschoud, *Zosime, Histoire Nouvelle II.1* (Paris, 1979), pp. xixff. (cogently negative, and with an excellent appreciation of Sapor's strategy); Barceló (n. 1), pp. 97, 101f. (negative, and again with a just valuation of the quality of the Persian defence and its similarity to the strategy of Constantius); Matthews (n. 15), pp. 158f.; Scholl (n. 26), p. 139.

been lost in 299.³⁶ But Ammianus' outrage at the acceptance of the terms (25.7.10) might suggest that he was implying that Persia wanted more. For the future a clause of which Ammianus' version is far from satisfactory was to be far more important: as he puts it (25.7.12), Rome, once the treaty was concluded, might never again help Arsaces against the Persians even if he asked it. This was to give Sapor freedom to invade Armenia unopposed, which duly happened, with Arsaces captured alive and a large part of the country seized by Persia.³⁷

The actual surrender of Nisibis gives rise to some other tantalizing remarks. The people of Nisibis feared Persian reprisals for all those occasions on which they had resisted Sapor (25.8.13f.). For, says Ammianus, it was generally agreed that the Persians could have secured control of the entire eastern world if Nisibis had not resisted them. This, and the description of Nisibis as *Orientis firmissimum claustrum*, present yet again the parallel perceptions of Persia bent on unlimited territorial aggrandizement and Rome concerned to do nothing more than prevent this. This defensive mindset also informs the bizarre remark of Sabinus, that Constantius had never lost anything, whereas Jovian at the very outset of his reign was surrendering the bulwarks of the provinces (25.9.3). Presumably a combination of rhetoric and parochialism accounts for the suppression of the loss of Amida and Bezabde. Ammianus confirms the defensive function of Nisibis when he says (25.9.8) that ever since the time of Mithradates it had resisted the occupation of the East by the Persians.

The peace gives rise to perhaps the most spectacular of all Libanius' distortions of the truth. More than twenty years later, in the speech on the temples (30.41), he praises Julian for reducing the Persians to a state in which they were ready to choose words instead of arms. This follows a reiteration of the claim he had already made more than once: that at the time of Julian's death the Persians had been on the verge of offering unconditional surrender (18.268, 1.133). His only comment on the peace itself is vague as to the terms and objectives, but is once again set firmly in the familiar mould of Persian aggression and Roman defensive response: Sapor demanded cities, territories, and peoples, the bulwarks of Roman security (18.278).

To summarize, all three of our authorities consistently present Roman policy as defensive in orientation, designed to protect the eastern provinces from the constant threat of Persian aggression. The goal of that aggression is more often than not seen, not as mere plunder but the conquest of the Roman East. The conception of Roman policy is extremely elastic in practice, being adapted to fit such widely divergent strategies as those of Constantius and Julian. There is also reason to believe that the notion that Julian intended to conquer Persia deserves to be taken much more seriously than has sometimes been the case.

The undoubted fact that in this period the attitudes of both Rome and Persia ultimately derived from the terms of the peace of 299 and the conflicting reactions of both sides to them is never more than hinted at; explanations in terms of character are preferred. Comparison with what all three writers say about the Rhine and Danube frontiers would go beyond the scope of this paper. It would, however, strongly suggest

³⁶ On the terms of the treaty, cf. Blockley, *Florilegium* 6 (1984), 35ff.; *ERFP*, pp. 27ff. His earlier view (art. cit. 35 with n. 44) that Rome had not recovered Singara since 360 seems preferable.

³⁷ On Ammianus' account of the effects of this clause between 363 and 378, cf. *Chiron* 26 (1996), 275ff.

that the defensive interpretation of Rome's eastern policy is not to be explained solely as a consequence of her general satisfaction with the peace of 299, since exactly the same assumptions inform these writers' treatment of policy on the northern frontier too.³⁸

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³⁸ Cf. for Constantius: Amm. 14.10.1; 17.13.1, 27f., 30; 19.11.1; Jul. *Or.* 1.7C, 9D, 35A; for Julian: Amm. 15.8.1, 6f.; 16.11.11; 17.1.11ff., 8.4f., 9.1, 10.4, 9 (cf. 18.2.6); 18.2.3ff., 19; 20.10.3; 21.13.13; Lib. *Or.* 12.40f., 48, 13.24, 18.31 (cf. 16); Jul. *Ep. Ath.* 279D (cf. 280D); for Valentinian: Amm. 28.2.1ff.; 29.4.1, 6.2 (cf. 29.6.5ff.; 30.5.11, 6.3); 30.3.2ff., 7.5f.; for Gratian: Amm. 31.10.2ff., 18 (cf. 11).